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Abstract
The topics of climate change and renewable energy often are linked in policy discussions and scientific
analysis, but public opinion on these topics exhibits both overlap and divergence. Although renewable
energy has potentially broader acceptance than anthropogenic climate change, it can also sometimes face
differently-based opposition. Analyses of U.S. and regional surveys, including time series of repeated
surveys in New Hampshire (2010–2018) and northeast Oregon (2011–2018), explore the social bases of
public views on both issues. Political divisions are prominent, although somewhat greater regarding
climate change. Such divisions widen with education, an interaction effect documented in other studies
as well. We also see robust age and temporal effects. Younger adults more often prioritize renewable
energy development, and agree with scientists on the reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC).
Across all age groups and both regional series, support for renewable energy and recognition of ACC
have been gradually rising. These trends, together with age-cohort replacement and possible changes in
age-group voting participation, suggest that public pressure for action on these issues could grow.
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1. Introduction
The topics of climate change and renewable energy often are linked in policy discussions and scientific
analysis. Slowing our rush toward increasingly severe impacts from anthropogenic climate change (ACC)
will require steep reductions in fossil fuel burning, and corresponding shifts to energy from renewable
sources that produce less greenhouse gases—such as electricity generated by wind, solar or tidal power.
Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions therefore becomes a key argument favoring renewable-energy
development (e.g., Long & Steinbecker 2016). It is not the only argument, however. Renewable energy
increasingly offers economic advantages including lower costs as well as new jobs, and income to
producers or landowners. Compared with coal or oil, it tends to generate less pollution of land, air and
water. Small-scale renewable energy such as rooftop solar also promises some degree of consumer
independence. These non-greenhouse arguments appeal to many of the same people concerned about
climate change, but they can also reach beyond, to some who reject the reality of ACC. At the same time,
the potential impacts of larger scale renewable-energy developments such as wind farms can inspire local
opposition from people who otherwise might support action on climate change (Bidwell 2013; Dreyer et
al. 2017; Hall et al. 2013; Olson-Hazboun et al. 2016; Petrova 2016; Wolsink 2007). Thus, renewable
energy has potentially broader appeal, but sometimes also broader-based opposition, compared with
public concern about climate change.
Scientists who study this topic express overwhelming agreement that evidence shows humans are
changing Earth’s climate in dangerous ways (e.g., Cook et al. 2016; USGCRP 2017). Among U.S.
political leaders and public, on the other hand, partisan divisions have been wide and persistent
(Carmichael & Brulle 2017; Dunlap & McCright 2015; Hamilton et al. 2015a; Marquart-Pyatt et al.
2014; Shwom et al. 2015). Conservatives are far less likely than moderates or liberals to agree with
scientists that ACC is occurring, or that anything should be done to slow it down. The association
between climate-change views and sociopolitical identity is so strong, statistically, that climate-change
questions could serve as proxies for political identity itself, with similar predictive skill to questions
about ideology or political party. Renewable-energy opinions likewise correlate with sociopolitical
identity, but this correlation is somewhat weaker for two reasons: renewable-energy cost, jobs or
independence advantages appeal to some conservatives; and large-scale energy developments such as
wind farms may stir resistance focused on local impacts, unrelated to views about climate. Appealing to
mixed or conservative stakeholders, advocates for renewable energy consequently often prefer to
emphasize cost and employment, income or decentralization benefits, downplaying those related to
climate (Cohen 2017; Deaton 2016; Jackson 2017).
How similar or different are the social bases of support for renewable-energy development, compared
with those for concern about climate change? Is public opinion shifting similarly on both topics? In a
recent paper we explored these questions using data from four U.S. survey projects—three regional and
one national in scope. The nationwide survey took place in 2016, with stages just before and after the
presidential elections. The three regional surveys all involve places with recent and controversial wind
energy developments, as described in Hamilton et al. (2018a). One of the regional surveys, in the North
Country of northern New England, occurred in summer of 2017. The other two regional projects, in
northeast Oregon and New Hampshire, each involved a series of surveys carried out over multiple
years—2011 to 2015 in Oregon, and 2010 (climate) or 2012 (renewable energy) to 2017 in New
Hampshire. For this paper we extend both timelines, and test for replication of earlier findings, using new
Oregon and New Hampshire data from fall 2018. With additional data we can examine the social bases of
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climate-change and renewable-energy views in finer detail. Results generally agree with earlier
conclusions, while providing a sharper view of age-related differences and trends.
2. Four Survey Projects
Data analyzed here come from four projects summarized in Table 1. For each project, trained personnel
at the Survey Center of the University of New Hampshire conducted cell and landline telephone
interviews with randomly-sampled participants. The nationwide POLES survey took place in two stages
just before and after the 2016 presidential elections, with negligible differences between these stages in
response patterns for environmental items (Hamilton et al. 2018a). The North Country survey took place
in summer 2017, interviewing residents of four rural counties in northern New England (Hamilton et al.
2017, 2018b). Two other regional projects, covering New Hampshire and northeast Oregon, each
involved a series of surveys carried out with independent random samples from 2010 or 2011 to 2018.
Many papers present results from various years of the Oregon surveys up to 2015 (e.g. Boag et al. 2016;
Hamilton et al. 2014, 2016a; Hartter et al. 2018) and New Hampshire surveys up to 2017 (e.g. Bolin and
Hamilton 2018; Hamilton et al. 2016b). Results from the 2018 Oregon and New Hampshire surveys are
presented for the first time in this paper.
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Table 1:  Four survey projects.
U.S. Polar, Environment, and Science (POLES). The POLES survey involved random-sample telephone
interviews (cell and landline) with respondents from all U.S. states, carried out in two stages: before the
2016 presidential elections (August, n = 704) and immediately afterwards (November/December, n = 707).
Response rates in four subsamples of the POLES survey ranged from 15 to 30% (all response rates are
calculated following AAPOR 2016 definition 3.) Several papers have focused on POLES results (Hamilton
2016a, 2018; Safford et al. 2019).
New Hampshire Granite State Poll (GSP). These landline and cell telephone surveys interview
independent random samples of New Hampshire residents four times each year. Along with standard
background and political questions, the GSP often carries items about environment or science. New
Hampshire responses on environmental questions commonly fall close to national benchmarks. Some
recent comparisons between New Hampshire and nationwide surveys are given by Hamilton (2016b) and
Hamilton et al. (2015a). The GSP from April 2010 to October 2018 conducted 20,786 interviews that
included our climate-change question, and from July 2012 to October 2018 conducted 7,707 with the
question about renewable energy. Median response rate over this period was 21.5 percent.
Northeast Oregon Communities and Forests in Oregon (CAFOR). Under the CAFOR project, landline and
cell telephone surveys involving independent random samples of northeast Oregon residents were
conducted in four stages: September/October 2011 (n = 1,585 from Baker, Union and Wallowa Counties);
August/October 2014 (n = 1,752, from the same three counties along with Crook, Grant, Umatilla and
Wheeler Counties); October/November 2015 (n = 651, repeating the seven counties from 2014); and
September 2018 (n = 1,097) in just the three original counties. Median response rate of the CAFOR
surveys was 38 percent. For consistency, our analysis in this paper focuses on 3,782 interviews from only
those counties (Baker, Union and Wallowa) that were surveyed in all four years. Voting patterns in all of
these northeast Oregon counties tend to be politically conservative, and surveys find lower-than-national
recognition of anthropogenic climate change (Hamilton et al. 2015a, 2018a).
North Country. In summer 2017, researchers with the Carsey School of Public Policy (University of New
Hampshire) conducted this random-sample cell and landline telephone survey of 1,650 residents in four
contiguous northern New England counties, collectively termed the North Country: Coös and Grafton
Counties, New Hampshire; Essex County, Vermont; and Oxford County, Maine. Designed to assess
changes in residents’ perceptions of their rural communities, the 2017 survey (response rate of 19%)
replicated some questions from earlier surveys, but also included new environmental and climate items.
Results are analyzed in two papers by Hamilton et al. (2017, 2018b).
Although research objectives varied across projects, and to a lesser extent across stages within each
project, many surveys carried two standard questions asking about renewable energy and climate change.
Table 2 gives the wording of these renew and climate questions, along with codes used for modeling
later. The surveys asked also about respondent background characteristics, for the most part with
identical wording. One exception is that the New Hampshire surveys asked respondents for their
ideological identification, here coded from –2 (extremely or fairly liberal) to +2 (extremely or fairly
conservative). The Oregon surveys recorded political party identification but not ideology, so our
analysis employs a simple three-party scheme from –1 (Democrat) to +1 (Republican) with these data.
(Political and education variables are centered at zero for use with interaction terms later.) The
independent variables also are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2:  Energy, climate change and background questions asked on multiple iterations of the New
Hampshire Granite State Poll (GSP) and northeast Oregon Communities and Forests in Oregon (CAFOR)
surveys over 2011 to 2018; on two iterations of the nationwide POLES survey in 2016; and on the one-
time North Country survey in 2017. Shown with codes used for logit regression analyses in Table 3.
Renew — Which do you think should be a higher priority for the future of this country, increased
exploration and drilling for oil, or increased use of renewable energy such as [tidal,] wind or solar?
(Response order rotated in interviews. Reference to “tidal” energy occurred only in the New Hampshire
surveys, where tests have shown that this word made no difference. The other surveys said “such as wind
or solar.”)
Increased use of renewable energy such as [tidal,] wind or solar (1)
Increased exploration and drilling for oil (0)
don’t know/no answer (0)
Climate — Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate?
(Response order rotated in interviews)
Climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities (1)
Climate change is happening now, but caused mainly by natural forces (0)
Climate change is not happening now (0)
Don’t know/no answer (0)
Age — Respondent’s age in years
Sex — Male (0) or female (1)
Education — High school or less (–1), some college or technical school (0), college graduate (1), or
postgraduate (2).
Ideology (New Hampshire GSP surveys) — Extremely or fairly liberal (–2), somewhat or leaning liberal
(–1), moderate not leaning (0), somewhat or leaning conservative (1), extremely or fairly conservative (2)
Party (Oregon CAFOR surveys) — Democrat (–1), Independent (0), Republican (1)
Year — Year of survey, from 2010 (New Hampshire) or 2011 (Oregon) to 2018
In the New Hampshire and Oregon series, as will be seen, response patterns on the renewable energy and
climate questions both changed over time. Figure 1 charts responses to renewable-energy (renew)
responses from the most recent year of each project: 2016 for the U.S. POLES survey, 2017 for the North
Country, or 2018 for northeast Oregon and New Hampshire. Large majorities of the respondents on each
survey, between 64 and 82 percent, consider increased use of renewable energy to be a higher priority.
The lowest number, 64 percent favoring renewable energy, represents northeast Oregon—politically a
very conservative region, where 67 to 73 percent of the voters in each county supported Trump in 2016.
Despite that region’s general conservativism, support for renewable energy is only 8 points lower in
northeast Oregon data compared with nationwide (64 vs. 72).
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Figure 1:  Should increased exploration and drilling for oil, or increased use of renewable energy such as
wind or solar, be a higher priority for the future of this country? Results from the most recent years of four
survey projects.
The two highest values in Figure 1, 78 or 82 percent favoring renewable energy, represent recent surveys
in comparatively moderate and mixed regions: the North Country (counties voting from 38 to 57 percent
for Trump) or New Hampshire (counties voting from 38 to 56 percent for Trump). The renew response
“Increased exploration and drilling for oil” intentionally echos a Republican campaign slogan from 2012
and 2016 elections, “Drill baby drill.” Despite substantial Republican presence in every region assessed,
however, this response was chosen by less than a quarter of the respondents.
Figure 2 charts response to the climate-change question (climate) in parallel fashion. U.S., New
Hampshire and North Country results are quite similar: 64 to 67 percent agreeing with the scientific
consensus that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. In sharp contrast,
just under half of the northeast Oregon respondents (48 percent) accept this consensus. The gap between
northeast Oregon and U.S. views on this item is 16 points (48 vs. 64), double that we saw on renewable
energy. The Oregon respondents are comparatively more likely to think climate is changing mainly for
natural reasons (38 percent) or even that it is not changing (6 percent), despite summer warming that has
worsened the wildfire seasons affecting their region (Hamilton et al. 2016a; Hartter et al. 2018).
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Figure 2:  Is climate change happening now, caused mainly by human activities? Is it happening now, but
caused mainly by natural forces? Or is climate change not happening now? Results from the most recent
years of four survey projects.
Comparing the renewable-energy and climate-change views in Figures 1 and 2 suggests that renewable
energy development is viewed favorably by many people who do not believe that human activities are
changing the climate. Moreover, the aggregate results imply that renewable energy views correlate less
strongly with politics. The next section tests this proposition more directly, and explores what other
respondent characteristics correlate with these views.
3. Social Bases of Energy and Climate Opinions
Decades of survey research on “the social bases of environmental concern” has established robust
patterns with regard to respondent age, sex, education and politics. Concern about environmental
problems, across many different topics, tends to be higher among younger, female and better educated
respondents. In some data one or more of these effects may be relatively weak or not significant, but they
almost always point in the same direction. More consistent and dominant predictors of environmental
concern, however, are ideology or political identity: conservatives less often view environmental
problems as serious or needing action.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that these propositions apply to views on renewable energy and climate
change. In each figure the (a) panel describes the most recent New Hampshire survey, and the (b) panel
the most recent Oregon survey. Generally similar results also occurred in the North Country and
nationwide surveys, and in earlier years from the New Hampshire and Oregon projects (not shown here,
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but see Hamilton et al. 2018a). Younger, female and better educated respondents more often prioritize
renewable energy, and more often agree that humans are changing Earth’s climate. Across each of these
four panels, ideological or political indicators have by far the strongest effects, with liberal-conservative
or Democrat-Republican gaps of 50 or 44 points on renewable energy, and 69 or 50 points on climate.
Age is the second-most consistent, with significant although weaker effects in all four panels yielding
young vs. old gaps of 16 or 17 points on renewable energy, and 21 or 22 points on climate.
Figure 3:  Weighted percentages for “renewable energy higher priority” broken down by respondent age,
sex, education and ideology or party on two surveys conducted in 2018: (a) statewide New Hampshire,
and (b) northeast Oregon.
Figure 4:  Weighted percentages for “climate change happening now, caused mainly by human activities”
broken down by respondent age, sex, education and ideology or party on two surveys conducted in 2018:
(a) statewide New Hampshire, and (b) northeast Oregon.
In general terms, Figures 3 and 4 contain no surprises: both renewable-energy and climate-change views
have similar demographic predictors, in common with many other environment-related topics. Both
exhibit strong political gradients, and weaker but also significant age gradients. In detail, however, this
four-way comparison reveals something else. Although the ideological or partisan gaps regarding
renewable energy on both surveys are wide, they are less wide than the corresponding gaps regarding
climate change. So renewable energy opinions do strongly correlate with politics, but not as strongly as
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climate-change opinions—as inferred indirectly from regional comparisons in the discussion of Figures 1
and 2.
4. Trends Over Time
From 2012 through fall of 2018, 13 New Hampshire surveys with a combined total of 7,707 interviews
carried the renewable-energy question, as did four northeast Oregon surveys (2011–2018) with 3,782
interviews. The upper line in Figure 5, drifting up about 21 points, tracks the percentage of New
Hampshire respondents who prioritize renewable energy. The bottom line shows an upward drift of about
14 points among northeast Oregon respondents. Nationwide results from the U.S. POLES surveys (1,411
interviews) appear slightly lower than contemporary New Hampshire results; North Country results
(1,650 interviews) match New Hampshire almost exactly. Error bars depict the 95 percent confidence
intervals for each survey. We see minor survey-to-survey variations, within the range of sampling error,
but the main impression is how replicable these findings are. Their short-term stability reflects use of
consistent sampling and interview methods, repeating a straightforward question. An earlier paper based
on Oregon data through 2015 and New Hampshire through 2017 observed similar upward trends, which
newer 2018 data now confirm for both series (Hamilton et al. 2018a).
Figure 5:  Weighted percentages and 95 percent confidence intervals for “renewable energy higher
priority” on two nationwide and 18 regional (New Hampshire, North Country or northeast Oregon) surveys.
Combined n = 14,550.
We have more data on the climate-change question, which has been asked on nationwide surveys in
2011, 2012, 2014 and 2016, along with 35 New Hampshire surveys. Figure 6 tracks these regional and
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national results. On climate change, New Hampshire public opinion is never far from national, and might
be viewed as a reasonable proxy. Hamilton et al. (2015a) describe the older national surveys in more
detail, and track New Hampshire results through spring of 2015. Figure 6 updates that analysis with data
from POLES 2016, North Country 2017, and New Hampshire and Oregon through 2018. As with the
renewable-energy results in Figure 5, the climate-change results in Figure 6 exhibit minor survey-to-
survey fluctuations, within sampling error bars. Overall, however, they show a high degree of
consistency around upward trends. Northeast Oregon acceptance of ACC remains well below national or
northeastern levels, but drifts similarly upward over this period. Multivariate analysis will later establish
that the trends of both Oregon and New Hampshire series in Figures 5 and 6 are statistically significant.
Figure 6:  Weighted percentages and 95 percent confidence intervals for “climate change happening now,
caused mainly by human activities” on five nationwide and 40 regional surveys. Combined n = 31,932.
Vertical lines in Figure 6 mark U.S. landfall dates of hurricanes and several other events. Around the
time each of these events occurred, it was widely speculated that they would influence public perceptions
about climate change. In no case are immediate impacts from such events visible in the data, however.
Instead we see a slow upward drift, plausibly reflecting the cumulative impact of science communication
(Hamilton 2016b).
Replication of the overall percentages seen in Figures 5 and 6 extend to more detailed analyses as well,
although sample-to-sample variation widens as we examine smaller subsamples. For example, Figure 7
tracks climate-change percentages separately for each political party, across 34 New Hampshire surveys.
All four parties exhibit roughly parallel upward trends. Separation into five levels of ideology from
liberal to conservative, as seen in Hamilton (2016b), paints a similar picture as well.
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Figure 7:  Weighted percentages “climate change happening now, caused mainly by human activities,” by
respondent political party on 34 New Hampshire surveys. Combined n = 19,020.
Figure 8 takes a different approach, graphing New Hampshire renewable energy (13 surveys) and
climate change (35 surveys) trends separately by age group. Linear trends rather than separate data points
are shown here because survey-to-survey variations with small subsamples otherwise make the graph
noisy and hard to read. The pro-environmental or scientific positions within each age group nevertheless
show clear upward trends. Millennials, roughly age 18 to 39, stand apart at the top of each panel: they are
consistently more likely than older age groups to favor renewable energy, or to think that humans are
changing the climate. Moreover, the solidarity among Millennials has been rising steadily, now past 90
percent on energy and 75 percent on climate.
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Figure 8:  Linear (ordinary least squares) trends by age group on statewide New Hampshire surveys for
(a) “renewable energy higher priority” 2012–2018, or (b) “climate change happening now, caused mainly
by human activities” 2010–2018.
Respondents 65 and older start out this period below anyone else, but their trends climb upward as well,
reaching 75 percent on energy and 60 percent on climate. Toward the end of this period, in both panels
there appears to be a degree of convergence between old and middle-aged respondents. Middle-aged
percentages started out halfway between young and old, but rose less steeply than the others.
In Figure 9 we calculate similar age-group trends from the Oregon data. The wider gap between
renewable-energy and climate views in this region is obvious from the different height of lines in Figure
9a and 9b. Renewable energy support rises more steeply than climate views in this region. A tertiary
detail, in which Oregon results echo New Hampshire, is the apparent convergence of middle-aged and
older views, as middle-aged views rise less steeply.
Figure 9:  Linear (ordinary least squares) trends by age group on northeast Oregon surveys 2011–2018,
for (a) “renewable energy higher priority”, or (b) “climate change happening now, caused mainly by human
activities.”
5. Effects of Age, Education and Politics
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Figures 3 and 4 chart bivariate relationships between renewable-energy or climate responses and four
background factors that often predict environment-related views. Figures 5–9 track the upward drift in
these views over time. Table 3 pulls these different background and timing factors together, while testing
the trends for significance. The columns give odds ratios from four weighted logistic regression models
with individual background factors and yearly trend as predictors. Parameters of each model are
estimated using all available data from the New Hampshire and Oregon surveys.
Table 3:  Respondent characteristics and survey timing as predictors of high priority for renewable energy
(renew), or think climate change is happening now, caused mainly by humans (climate). Values shown are
odds ratios (e ) from probability-weighted logit regressions with either New Hampshire GSP or NE Oregonb
CAFOR survey datasets (3 original counties), pooled over all available years.
Surveys and Dependent Variable
New Hampshire GSP NE Oregon CAFOR
Predictor 1. Renew 2. Climate 3. Renew 4. Climate
Age 0.983*** 0.988*** 0.982*** 0.982***
Sex (female) 0.990 1.373*** 1.069 1.079
Education 1.124** 1.203*** 1.173** 1.225***
Ideology 0.485*** 0.501*** ... ...
Education×ideology 0.876*** 0.827*** ... ...
Party ... ... 0.348*** 0.368***
Education×party ... ... 0.931 0.778***
Year 1.179*** 1.070*** 1.119*** 1.102***
estimation sample 6,904 18,610 3,333 3,333
F statistic 133.58*** 430.89*** 58.94*** 59.87
pseudo R 0.197 0.210 0.150 0.1652
*p < 0.05;  **p < 0.01;  ***p < 0.001  (Wald tests)
Odds ratios significantly above 1.0 for year, across all four models in Table 2, confirm the upward drift
of support for renewable energy and acceptance of ACC in both New Hampshire and Oregon data (p <
0.001). We also see odds ratios significantly below 1.0 for age across all four models (p < 0.001). That
is, older respondents in both New Hampshire and Oregon are less inclined to prioritize renewable energy,
and also less inclined to believe that humans are changing the climate. (Note that age is entered as a
measurement variable—simply, age in years—for the models of Table 2; but age had been grouped for
readability in the figures.) The year and age effects in Table 2 agree with simpler results graphed in
Figures 8 and 9: clear ordering and wide separation of response preferences by age regardless of trend,
and upward trends regardless of age.
Women accept the reality of ACC at higher rates than men do in our New Hampshire data, but other sex
differences in Table 2 are not significant. Education, like age and year, affects responses across all four
models. Because education appears also in interactions with ideology or party, these main effects from
education (with odds ratios significantly above 1.0) represent the positive influence of education among
political moderates (ideology = 0) or Independents (party = 0). Moderates or Independents who have
college educations are more likely than their peers to support renewable energy, and to think that ACC is
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real. By similar reasoning, the main effects of ideology and party represent the effects of these
characteristics among respondents who completed technical school or some college (education = 0).
The effects of education vary, however, depending on political identity. The education×ideology or
education×party interactions in Table 2, significant (p < 0.001) in all but model 3, replicate a result that
has been widely noticed in survey research on environment or science-related topics: the partisan spread
on many issues widens with education, so better-educated partisans stand the farthest apart. Figure 10
visualizes these effects through adjusted margins plots, calculated from models 1–4 in Table 3. In both
New Hampshire (top) and Oregon (bottom) data, this interaction is strongest regarding climate change. A
similar though weaker effect can be seen in the New Hampshire responses on renewable energy, as well.
These findings incorporating new data agree with earlier conclusions of Hamilton et al. (2018a).
Figure 10:  Probability of prioritizing renewable energy, or recognizing the reality of anthropogenic climate
change, by education and ideology (New Hampshire) or political party (northeast Oregon). Adjusted
margins plots calculated from models of Table 2.
Each of the panels in Figure 10 shows that education has a positive effect on renewable-energy support,
or acceptance of ACC, among liberals and moderates (or among Democrats and Independents).
Education has a negative effect, however, on ACC acceptance among the most conservative, or among
Republicans, in both New Hampshire and Northeast Oregon (Figures 10b and 10d). Education similarly
has a negative effect on renewable energy support in New Hampshire: better-educated conservatives are
less inclined to support it. Education effects on renewable-energy support in northeast Oregon are very
weak.
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The Figure 10 interaction results join a substantial list of other studies and datasets where analogous
education×politics or information×politics-type effects have been found. Examples include Bolin and
Hamilton (2018), Drummond and Fischhoff (2017), Hamilton (2008), Hamilton and Safford (2015),
Hamilton et al. (2010, 2015a, 2015b), Kahan (2015), Kahan et al. (2011), McCright and Dunlap (2011)
and Shao et al. (2014). The immediate precursor to this paper, Hamilton et al. (2018a), found essentially
the same interactions in earlier data. The “right-facing megaphone” shape of polarization widening with
education, as seen in Figures 10a, 10b and 10d, reflects a pervasive reality of current U.S. politics.
6. Discussion
The strong effect sociopolitical identity exerts on U.S. public opinion about climate change is well
known. Despite divergence in the rationales regarding climate and renewable-energy development,
sociopolitical identity has major impacts on the latter issue as well—albeit, somewhat less strongly.
Moreover, the education×politics interaction effect, which leads to a partisan gap that widens with
education, is less pronounced on renewable energy. Partisan polarization nevertheless slows U.S.
renewable energy development, as it does other steps toward climate-change mitigation. Our analysis
confirms these recognized conclusions.
Two other robust findings hint at future changes, however. First, there are consistent age effects. In the
most recent surveys more than 90 percent of New Hampshire respondents age 18 to 29 favor renewable
energy, as do 77 percent in northeast Oregon. Those fractions are 16 or 17 points higher than they are
among people 65 and older. The generational gap is even wider (21 or 22 points) regarding climate
change. Multivariate analysis of both datasets over all years of the study confirms that age has significant
positive effects (p < 0.001) on both climate and energy views, even after controlling for sex, education,
political orientation and year of survey. Assuming no change in people’s individual views, gradual cohort
replacement could raise public acceptance of renewable energy and other climate-change mitigation
steps. If voter participation rates among young adults rise, as some observers expect, the balance might
shift more quickly.
Another robust result is that, over the period of observation, support for renewable energy and
acceptance of anthropogenic climate change have been gradually rising. For each series in both datasets,
the increase exceeds 10 percentage points (p < 0.001), with renewable energy climbing at slightly faster
rates than climate. It is worth noting that these trends are established in models (Table 2) that already
account for respondent age, so they do not reflect possible cohort shifts noted above. By the same token,
the age effects estimated in those models are independent of overall trends. Figures 8–9 visualized the
distinct age and temporal patterns in terms of separate upward trends within age groups. These trends add
further reason, besides the certainty of cohort replacement and the possibility of more voting by young
adults, to think that public support for action on these issues will grow.
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